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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASES

A. Nature of the Cases.

The overarching question in these consolidated appeals is whether a license to practice
law is a shield to liability for engaging in, and assisting in the commission of, tortious conduct.
Among the issues presented are an attorney's liability for accepting payment from fbnds the
attorney knows are subject to a security interest, whether an attorney purportedly representing a
corporation may assist interested and confl~ctedd~rectorsin tortious conduct, and whether
tortious conduct committed by an attorney during the course of purported representation is, as
Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown successfully argued below, nothing Inore than zealous, and
therefore lawful, representation. These appeals also address issues of first impression relating to
clai~usagainst attorneys, defenses to claims against attorneys, and a creditor and stock pledgee's
standing to assert direct and derivative claims. The facts and allegations are set forth in detail in
Reed Taylor's respective Complaints and proposed Amended Cotnplaints. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23
and 133-176; Vol. It, pp. 239-264 and 406-453.)
B. Procedural History.
On August 18, 2008, Reed Taylor filed complaints in district court of the Second Judicial
District in Nez Perce County against Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins,
Richard A. Riley, and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LP (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Hawley Troxell") and Michael M. McNichols and Cle~nentsBrown & McNichols, P.A.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Clements Brown"). (R. Vol. I, p. 1; Vol. 11, p. 239.)
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Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown moved to dismiss Reed Taylor's Complaints on September
10,2008, and September 29, 2008, respectively. (R. Vol. I, p. 24; Vol. 11, p. 265.)
On October 2,2008, the district court entered a stay of all discovery and no discovery has
been taken in these actions.' (R. Vol. 11, pp. 3 15-18.) On October 16,2008, Reed Taylor moved
to amend his Complaints and served proposed Amended Complaints, which such Amended
Complaints more clearly detail the facts and specifically pled all elements necessary for every
cause of action. (R. Vol. I, pp. 130-76; Vol. 11, pp. 403-53.) On October 17, 2008, the district
court held consolidated hearings on Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's Motions to Dismiss.
c t held consolidated hearings on
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 7,ll. 2-18.) On December 4, 2008, the d ~ s t ~ icourt
Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend Complaint. (R. Vol. I, p. 188; Vol. 111, p. 468.)
On December 23,2008, the district court granted Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's
Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss and denied Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. (R. Vol. I, p.
188-205; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) On January 30, 2009, Reed Taylor filed Notices of Appeal in
both actions. (R. Vol. I, p. 227; Vol. 111, p. 310.) On April 3, 2009, the district court awarded
attorneys' fees to Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00103-114 and
00289-97.) On April 24, 2009, the district court entered judgments against Reed Taylor for
$20,058 in each action. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 001 15-17 and 00259-61.) On May 4, 2009, Reed
Taylor moved for reconsideration of the award of any attorneys' fees, as had Hawley Troxell and
Clements Brown. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 001 18, 00133, 00278 and 00262.)

' Although only entered in the Hawley Troxell case, no discovery took place in either action.
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On May 15, 2009, Reed Taylor filed Amended Notices of Appeal to include the award of
attorneys' fees and the Court instructed him to file a Motion to Augment Record. (Supp. Mot.
Aug. R. pp. 00306 and 00314.) On June 1, 2009, the District Court entered an order dcnying
Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's Mot~onsfor Reconsideration regarding the
award of attorneys' fees. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00147-55 and 00289-97.) On June 4, 2009, Reed
Taylor filed his Second Amended Notices of Appeal. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00156 and 00298.)
C. Statement of Facts.

Reed Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Idaho and an elderly person as defined by I.C. $
48-608. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1 and 134; Vol. 11, pp. 239 and 407-08.) Clements Brown and Hawley
Troxell are entities and attorneys engaged in the practice of law in Idaho. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-2 and
134; Vol. 11, pp. 240 and 407-08.)
Reed Taylor is owed over $8.5 Million by AIA Services Corporation (hereinafter "&
Services") through a $6 Million promissory note dated August 1, 1995 (hereinafter "$6M Note").
(R. Vol. I, pp. 3 and 135-36; Vol. 11, pp. 241 and 409-10.) As security for the payment of the
$6M Note, AIA Services granted Reed Taylor the only security interest in d l of the shares of
stock of AIA Insurance, Inc. (hereinafter "AIA Insurai~ce") and gave him the irrevocable
contractual right to vote the shares of AIA Insurance upon AIA Services' default in its
contractual obligations to Reed Taylor. (R. VOI. I, pp. 3 and 142; Vol. 11, pp. 242 and 416.)
Reed Taylor also held the only valid and perfected security interests in d l of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance's commissions and related receivables, i.e., all of the corporations' revenues. (R.
Vol. I, pp. 3, 19 and 136; Vol. II., pp. 259-60 and 409-10.) Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown
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had full knowledge of AIA Services contractual obligations owed to Reed Taylor. (R. Vol. I, pp.
3 and 142; Vol. 11, pp. 241 and 415.)
On August 1, 2005, the $6M Note matured and Reed Taylor provided written notice of
default to AIA Services on December 12, 2006. (R. Vol. I, pp. 3 and 142; Vol. TI, pp. 241 and
415.)

On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted all of the shares of AIA Insurance and

attempted to take control of the corporation as provided by the contract documents and I.C.

5 30-

1-722. (R. Vol. I, pp. 4 and 142-43; Vol. 11, pp. 242 and 416.)
R. John Taylor (hereinafter "John Taylor"), James Beck, Michael Cashnlan, and other
individuals are all past or present interested directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance who
have a vested interest in not pursuing claims against themselves or the attorneys unlawfully
assisting them. (R. Vol. I, pp. 138-39; Vol. 11, pp. 41 1-13.) In taking directions from interested
and not properly elected directors (John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck), Hawley Troxell
and Ciements Brown's representation is not, and could not, be in the best Interests of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance, and exceeded any scope of representation. (R. Vol. I, pp. 7, 12-13
and 140-41; Vol. 11, pp. 246-50 and 412-14.) Any purported legal representation waivers
obtained by Clelnents Brown and Hawley Troxell were not obtained fiom authorized and
disinterested directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. (R. Vol. I, pp. 7 and 139-41; Vol. If,
pp. 246 and 412-14.)
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Jaines Beck, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman are past and
present directors and officers of the closely-held AIA Services and AIA Insurailce, they are all
interested parties by way of their tortious acts and ownership of shares in CropUSA Insurance
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Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA"), and any recovered funds should not be placed in their hands. (R.
V O ~I,. p. 135; Vol. TI., p. 408-09.)
In 2007, Reed Taylor filed a Complaint against AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA,
John Taylor and other individual defendants for fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy,
conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims (hereinafter "Taylor v. AIA Services, et

al.").

(R. Vol. I, p. 4; Vol. 11, p. 243.) In Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., Clements Brown

undertook to represent three separate clients with irreconcilable conflicts of interest

-

AIA

Services, AIA Insurance and R. John Taylor (an individual accused of misappropriating millions
of dollars of the corporations' assets). (R. Vol. I, pp. 5 and 144.) As a result of Reed Taylor's
assertions that the representation violated Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter ''W'),
Clements Brown withdrew from representing AIA Services and AIA Insurance on March 28,
2007. (R. Vol. I, pp. 5 and 145.) Shortly thereafter, in Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., Hawley
Troxell undertook to represent two separate clients with irreconcilable conflicts of interest - AIA
Services and AIA Insurance, and later appeared and represented a third corporate defendant,
CropUSA. (R. Vol. 11, pp. 244-45 and 418-20.)
Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell also unlawfully and inappropriately entered into a
joint defense agreement along with AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, John Taylor, James
Beck, Connie Taylor, and other individual defendants accused of committing fraud, breaches of
fiduciary duties and other torts against AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Reed Taylor. (R. Vo1.
I, pp. 7-9, 18-19 and 146-50; Vol. 11, pp. 245-49, 258-59 and 419-23.)

CropUSA, one of

Hawley Troxell's purported three corporation clients, was the recipient of millions of dollars of
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funds fraudulently transferred from AIA Services and AIA Insurance and the recipient of an
unlawful $15 Million loan guarantee by AIA Insurance. (R. Vol. I, pp. 13-15, 144, 160-62; Vol.
11, pp. 243-44,253,417,433-36 and 426.)
Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell have full knowledge of the millions of dollars of
AIA Services and AIA Insurance's funds, assets and services that have been unlawfully
transferred to CropUSA. (R. Vol. I, pp. 9, 12, 16-17 and 138; Vol. 11, pp. 249, 251, 255-57 and
414.) With the full knowledge of Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell, the past and present
purported board members of AIA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to conduct shareholder
meetings, hiled to provide disclosure of transactions and facts to shareholders, and have
continued to do so even after the Complaints were filed in this action. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 138-39;
Vol. 11, p. 412.)
During the course of their purported representation, Hawley Troxell and Clernents Brown
attended and participated in inappropriate board meetings when they knew the boards were not
properly seated and were comprised of interested directors, resulting in all such board resolutions
and actions as being null and void, to include the decisions to hire Hawley Troxell and Clements
Brown. (R. Vol. I, pp. 15-18, 40; Vol. 11, pp. 251-58.) In other words, Hawley Troxell and
Clements Brown were knowingly taking actions in Taylor v. AZA Services, et a/., from
unauthorized boards of directors who were not properly seated and who did not meet the
requirements to be a board member under the corporations' bylaws. (R. Vol. I, pp. 17-18; Vol.
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During the course of their purported representation, Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown
accepted payments for fees in excess of hundreds of thousands of dollars and assisted interested
and conflicted parties in unlawfully transferring and/or encumbering millions of dollars in assets
belonging to AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and in making decisions that were not in the
corporations' best interests. (R. Vol. I, pp. 3-22 and 406-52; Vol. 11, pp. 241-62 and 133-75.) In
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("the RPC's"), Clements Brown and Hawley
Troxell undertook to simultaneously represent multiple named parties without obtaining propcr
consents. (R. Vol. I, pp. 8 and 144-45; Vol. 11, pp. 247 and 418-19.) Hawley Troxell and
Clements Brown assisted and/or aided and abetted interested individuals and CropUSA in acts of
fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties and
actions detrimental to AIA Services and AIA Insurance. (R. Vol. I, p. 10-1 I and 158-59; Vol. 11,
p p 249-50 and 432-33.)
During the course of their purported representation, Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown
represented AIA Services and AIA Insurance at various times in which the district court entered
an injunction against Reed Taylor from repossessing AIA Insurance and acting as its director and
officer, with full knowledge that the assets and funds of AIA Insurance were being
misappropriated and not safeguarded, i.e., counsel for the corporations should have required the
interested insiders accused of fraud and other torts post sufficient security to protect the
corporations. (R. Vol. I, pp. 16, 143, 155-56; Vol. 11, pp. 256, 416,428-29.) Unfortunately, the
district court misinterpreted Reed Taylor's Complaints for torts as disenfranchised responses to
"zealous representation." (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.)
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On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor served derivative demand letters upon the purported
boards of directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance demanding the boards take appropriate
action against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown. (R. Vol. I, p. 138; Vol. 11, pp. 41 1-12.) No
actions were taken by the purported boards of AIA Insurance and AIA Services. Id.
On August 18, 2008, Reed Taylor filed Complaints against Hawley Troxell and Clements
Brown asserting direct causes of action for fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, tortious
interference, malpractice (mcluding third-party bencficiary), violations of I.C. § 48-601, et seq.,
and aiding and abetting and conspiring to assist others in the commission of torts. (R. Vol. I, pp.
18-33; Vol. 11, pp. 258-64.) In his original Complaints, Reed Taylor assertcd that he was
bringing certain claims directly against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown and that he was not
asserting derivative claims. (R. Vol. I. p. 2; Vol. 11, p. 3.) Reed Taylor also asserted that "all
appliiable facts alleged.. .are inioporated by reference into each cause of action as necessary to
support each such cause of action." (R. Vol. I, p. 1; Vol. 11, p. 239.) When he moved to amend
his complaint, Reed Taylor also assertcd derivative actions. (R. Vol. I, pp. 136-37; Vol. 11, pp.
414-15.)
Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown filed Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss Reed
Taylor's Complaints for failure to stale a claim oil September 10, 2008, and September 29, 2008,
respectively. (R. Vol. I, pp. 26-61; Vol. 11, pp. 267-99.) Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown
filed Answers denying most of the factual allegations asserted by Reed Taylor in his Complaint
on September 26, 2008, and October 1, 2008, respectively. (R. Vol. I, pp. 62-70; Vol. 11, pp.
300-13.)
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On October 9, 2009, Reed Taylor filed Responses in Opposition to Defendants' Motions
to Dismiss. (R. Vol. I, pp. 72-129; Vol. 11, pp. 319-3758.) On October 16, 2008, Reed Taylor
moved to amend his Complaints to bring derivative and direct claims. (R. Vol. I, pp. 130-76;
Vol. 11, pp. 403-53.) In addition to clarifying and organizing Reed Taylor's previously pled
causes of action, the proposed Amended Complaints pled derivative and dzrect causes of action
and new causes of action. (R. Vol. I, pp. 130-76; Vol. 11, pp. 403-53.)
On December 23, 2008, the district court, after considering matters outside of the record,
granted Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss and denied
Reed Taylor's Motions to Amend. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-205; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.) In its Opinions
and Orders, the district court painted a picture as though no improprieties or unlawful activities
had taken place, considered matters outside of the record, failed to consider as true the factual
allegations asserted by Reed Taylor and made factual findings that contradict the facts asserted in
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints. (R. VoI. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111,
pp. 468-83.) In addition, the district court failed to address a number of legal authorities and
arguments asserted by Reed Taylor and failed to address certain causes of action. Id.
On January 6, 2009, Clements Brown and Hawley Troxell filed Memorandums of Costs
and Attorneys' Fees. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00001-4 and 00173-78.) On January 20, 2009, Reed
Taylor filed Motions to Disallow Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown's Request for Attorneys'
Fees. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00027-56 and 00179-206.)
On April 3, 2009, the district court awarded $20,000 in attomeys' fees to Hawley Troxell
and $20,000 in attomeys' fees Clements Brown. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00103-14 and 00247-58.) In
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its Opinions and Orders, the district court failed to address certain claims and failed to address
the first impression issues, novel claims, and unsettled law involving Reed Taylor's causes of
action. Id. On April 24, 2009, the district court entered judgments against Reed Taylor for
$20,058 in each action. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00115-17 and 00259-61.) On May 4, 2009, Reed
Taylor moved for reconsideration of the award of any attorneys' fees. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 001 1832 and 00262-77.) On June 1, 2009, the district court denied Reed Taylor's Motions for
Reconsideration and again made factual findings that contradicted the facts asserted in Reed
Taylor's Complainls. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00147-55 and 00289-297.)
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Did the district court err when it failed to apply the required I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) standards?
B. Did the district court err when it detennined Reed Taylor did not have standing to pursue
direct and derivative causes of action against ~ a w l Troxell
e ~ and Clements Brown?
C. Did the district court e n in dismissing Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended
Complaints against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)?
D. Assuming Idaho adopts the "litigation privilege" as a defense for attorneys, what is the
scope of the defense and does it provide complete immunity for tort claims and claims
pertaining to exceeding the scope of purported representation?
E. Did the district court err when it refused to permit Reed Taylor to amend his Complaints?
F. Did the district court err when it awarded attorneys' fees to Hawley Troxell and Clements
Brown?
G. In the event the Court reverses the district court's dismissal, should the Court decide all
issues presented by Reed Taylor to prevent further appeals thereby permitting the speedy
and efficient resolutio~lof the cases?
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111. ARGUMENTS

A. Standards of Review.
i.

Standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

In reviewing a district court's order granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6), the standard of review is the same as that used in summary judgment. Gallagher v.

State, 141 Idaho 665, 667, 115 P.3d 756, 758 (2005). "After viewing all facts and inferences
from the record in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief
has been stated." Id,(citing Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d
300, 310 (1999)). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the
party is 'entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."' Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc , 140
Idaho 349, 351, 93 P.3d 680, 682 (2004) (quoting BHA Inv., Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 350,63
P.3d 474, 476 (2003)). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach
d~fferingconclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. Iron Eagle

Dev'f, L L C v Qzlality Design Sys , Inc , 138 Idaho 487,491,65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003).
ii.

Standard of review for denial of a motion to amend.

"A [district] court's decision to allow the amendment of pleadings is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion." Haywavd v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 345,33 P.3d 816,819
(2001). To review an exercise of discretion; the Supreme Court applies a three factor test, which
such factors are:
(1)Whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether
the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court
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reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228,232,61 P.3d 585,589 (2002).
iii.

Standard of review for an award of attorney fees.

"When an award of attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute, the standard
of review for statutory interpretation applies." BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engr 's, Inc., 145
Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008). "'The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
over which the Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review."' Id. (quoting Carrier v. Lake Pend

Oreille Sch. Dist. #84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006)). An award of attorney
fees under I.C.

5

12-121 is addressed to the trial court's discretion. Turner v. Willis, 116 Idaho

However, that discretion is not untrammeled. When reviewing an exercise of discretion,
we inquire (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2)
whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Here, the critical question is whether the judge made
his decision consistently with applicable legal standards.

Needs v. State, 118 Idaho 207,208,795 P.2d 912,913 (Ct. App. 1990).
iv.

Reed Taylor may assert new arguments on appeal.

The Court addresses for the first time on appeal issues not raised in the trial court from a
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim and constitutionality issues.

Sharp, 139 Idaho 599,602,83 P.3d 773,776 (2003) (rehearing denied (2004)).
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Warren v.

B. The district court erred when it failed to applv the re~uiredI.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)
standards.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court looks only at the pleadings,
and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137
Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id.
"Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim." Idaho Comm'n on Human Rzghts v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217,
506 P.2d 112, 114 (1973). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claims which would entitle him to relief. Wackevli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 404, 353 P.2d
782, 784 (1960).
The court should be especially reluctant to dismiss on the pleading where the asserted
theory of liability is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories be
explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader's supposition.
Stewart, 92 Idaho 526, 531, 446 P.2d 895, 900 (1968). "The motion to dismiss serves its most
useful purpose where from the pleadings and documented proof available no controverted [act
issue remains and only questions of law are to he decided." Stewart v Avrington Const. Co , 92
Idaho 526, 531, 446 P.2d 895, 900 (1968) (citing Slzull v. Pilot Lqe Ins. Co., 313 F.2d 445, 447
(5th Clr.)).. "The validity of a complaint is more properly tested by the summary judgment
procedure of I.R.C.P. 56." Id. "When a court considers matters outside the pleadings, such
motion must be treated as a notion for summary judgment." Hayes v. Conway, 144 Idaho 503,
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506-7, 163 P.3d 1215, 1218-19 (Ct. App. 2007); I.R.C.P. 12(b).
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints asserted numerous
sufficiently pled causes of action. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23, 133-175 and 188-206; Vol. 11, pp. 239264, 406-453 and 468-484.) The dlstrict court erred in not following Rule 12(b)(6) standards
and in considering matters outside of the record and in not converting and disposing of the Rule
12(b)(6) motions in accordance with Rule 56. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.)
C. The district court erred when it determined Reed Taylor did not have standine to
pursue direct and derivative causes of action against Hawley Troxell and Clements

Brown.

As legal theories pertaining to direct and derivative actions overlap or are discussed in
more detail under certain standing arguments below, Reed Taylor incorporates by reference all of
the below arguments into a single argument for purposes of brevity and thoroughness. Based
upon the facts and arguments asserted below, the district court erred in dismissing Reed Taylor's
Complaints and denying his Motions to Amend as he has standing under numerous theories.
i.

Reed Taylor has standing to assert claims against the attorneys.

The issue of standing focuses on the party seeking rel~efand not on the issues the party
w~shesto have adjudicated, which may be based upon threatened harm as well as past injury.
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1238 (2006). "An attorney can be liable
to a nonclient, even an adversary in litigation, for fraud or deceit. Duty is not at issue, because
wrong is intentional conduct."

I Legal Malpractice § 6:7 (2008) (internal citations omitted)

(emphasis added); see also Banco Popular North America v Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005).
"[A] lawyer is subject to liability to a...nonclient when a nonlawyer would be in similar
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circumstances."

Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers

5

56 (2008). This basis

concept of lawyer liability is discussed in numerous Cornlnents in 5 56:
If activities of a nonlawyer in the same circumstances would render the nonlawyer civilly
liable or afford the nonlawyer a defense to liability, the same activities by a lawyer in the
same circumstances generally render the lawyer liable.. .
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers 5 56 (2008), Comment b.
When a lawyer advises or assists a client in acts that subject the client to civil liability to
others, those others may seek to hold the lawyer liable along with or instead of the client.
Whether a lawyer is liable depends on the elements of liability under the law upon which
the claim of liability is predicated and may therefore turn on such facts as how the
lawyer's acts contributed to the plaintiffs harm, what the lawyer knew or believed as to
the relevant facts and law, the lawyer's intent, and how culpable the client's conduct is...
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 56 (2008), Comment c. "A law firm is
subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by any wrongful act or omission of
any principal or employee of the firm.. ." Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers

5 58

(2008) ("When firm principals are personally liable vicariously, they are jointly and severally
liable." Comment g.)
Reed Taylor has sustained direct damages and injury to his collateral and security
interests, and has standing to pursue claims against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown for
their torts and other claims. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23 and 133-175; Vol. 11, pp. 239-264 and 406-453.)
ii.

Reed Taylor has standing to pursue direct and derivative causes of action as
the pledgee of all of AIA Insurance's shares.

A stock pledgee has standing to bring direct claims against third parties. Aurora Credit
Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 1998); Schumacher
v. Schumacher, 469 N.W. 2d 793 (N.D. 1991); Gustafson v. Gustafsoiz, 734 P.2d 949, 953
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(Wash. App. 1987); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Kerr, 637 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. N.C. 1986);
Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. App. 1980) (overruled on other grounds); Empire
Life Ins. Co. of America v. Valdak Corp, 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972); 19 Am. Jur. 2d
Corporations

5 2032 (2008); 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. 5 5651 (2008) ("The

pledgee may file suit

in equity to preserve the stock and to protect his or her interests, to the same extent. at least, as
the pledgor ...) (emphasis added). Generally, shareholders must pursue claims derivatively, i.e.,
on behalf of the corporation. However, a well-recognized exception to this general rule is that a
shareholder in a closely held corporation may file a

direct action without bringing the claims

derivatively in the name of the corporation. Steelman v. Mallory, 1 10 Idaho 5 10, 5 12-13, 7 16
P.2d 1282, 1284-1285 (1986) ("we cannot agree with appellants' contention that this case should
have been dismissed because it is a 'direct action' rather than a shareholder's derivative suit.").
Since a pledgee has the rights of a shareholder, the pledgee has the shareholder's standing to
pursue direct and derivative claims:

...Under some authority, the analysis for determining whether a stockholder's action
should be.. .direct or derivative turns on the determination of who suffered the alleged
h
stockholder individually, and who would receive the
benefit of recoverv or other remedy.

-

...When a shareholder's complaint states a cause of action that is both direct and
derivative, the shareholder may proceed with the direct action.
18 C.J.S. Corporations

I.C.

5

5 485

(2008) (internal citations omitted) (e~nphasisadded). Moreover,

30-1-740, et seq., does not prohibit a pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of a
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corporation from pursuing derivative

claim^.^

Reed Taylor pled that he was the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance
and has standing to pursue direct and derivative claims on behalf of AIA Insurance. (R. Vol. I,
pp. 2-4 and 135-36; Vol. 11, pp. 241-42 and 409-10.)
iii.

Reed Taylor has standing to assert direct and derivative claims as a secured
creditor of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.

When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has standing to
bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. First Sec. Bank of Idaho,
N.A. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664 P.2d 281, 284-285 (Ct. App. 1983)
The rights of a secured creditor are extensive:
In most cases when a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral, the security
interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the secured party may
repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an appropriate case, maintain an action
for conversion. The secured party may claim both any proceeds and the original
collateral.. ..
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a conversion of the
collateral,&
of the one who sells, as well as on the part of
the one who purchases, or to whom property is transferred, or a third party who exercises
dominion over the collateral or its proceeds.. .
79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions 5 157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).3
Reed Taylor's pled that he has security interests in the stock, commissions and related

The ABA Official Comment to Sections 30-1-740 states: "[ijn the context of sections 30-1-740 through 30-1-747,
beneficial owner means a person havinr a direct economic interest in the shares" (emphasis added). Reed Taylor is
the only party with a direct economic interest in all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance as the only pledgeee
in all of the shares are pledged as collateral to him for the payment of the over $8.5 Million owed to him. Moreover,
as theonly secured creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, Reed Taylor is the only person having a direct economic
interest in the coiporation.
See also Sections III(C)(ii) and (iv), which are incdrpora~edby reference herein.
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receivables of AIA Insurance and the commissions and related receivables of AIA Services. (R.
Vol. I, pp. 3, 19 and 135-37; Vol. 11, pp. 242, 259-60 and 409-10.) As such, he has standing to
assert claims against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown.

iv.

Reed Taylor has standing to assert d k c t and derivative causes of action as a
creditor of the insolvent AIA Services.

A creditor of an insolvent corporation has standing to bring direct claims and claims on
behalf of the corporation. In re MS55, Inc., 2008 W L 2358699 (D. Colo. 2008); Board of
Trzlstees of Teamsters v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 170 (3rd Cir. 2002); Asarco LLC v.
Americas Min. Corp., 382 B.R. 49 (S.D. Tex 2007). A creditor of an insolvent corporation has
standing to assert derivative breach of fiduciary claims against directors and other direct nonfiduciary claims. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. Supr. 2007).~
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints pled that he was a secured
creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, holding a security interest in all commissions and related
receivables, i.e., all of its

revenue^.^

(R. Vol. I, pp. 2-3, 7, 21-22 and 136-38; Vol. 11, pp. 241-42,

262 and 409-10.) Taking these facts as true he has standing to assert claims herein.

4

In Gheewalla, the court's rationale for limiting claiii~sfor breach of fiduciary duty to derivative actions was to
permit the directors the Geedom to enter into negotiations with creditors. Id. at 103. Here, Reed Taylor is not only a
creditor of the insolventNA Services, but he is the only secured creditor entitled to all of the assets in priority of
any other creditor-providing the basis for the Court to not follow Gheewallu and permit Reed Taylor to assert
direct causes of action.
The cases dealing with a creditor's right to bring derivative claims typically involve general creditors, rather than
secured creditors like Reed Taylor, who have even more legal rights.
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v.

Reed Taylor has standing to assert direct and derivative causes of action as a
shareholder and director of AIA Insurance and required director of AIA
Services.

A shareholder and director of a closely-held corporation has standing to bring direct
claims. Steelman, 110 Idaho at 512-513,716 P.2d at 1284-1285. A director or officer may bring
claims against other parties in a quasi-derivative action. Law of Corp. Offs. & Dirs.: Rts., Duties
& Liabs.

5 9:27 (2008) (citing New York law).

The pledgee may file suit in equity to preserve the stock and to protect his or her
interests, to the same extent, at least, as the pledger.. .The pledgee is also interested in the
preservation of the corporate property and in preventing it from passing out of the hands
of the corporation.. .
12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. 5 5651 (2008) (emphasis added).6
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints pled that he was the only
pledgee (shareholder under the above authority) and director of AIA Insurance and was required
to be director of AIA Services. (R. Vol. I, pp. 2-4,21, 33 and 139-40; Vol. 11, pp. 241-42, 25455,409 and 413-14.) Thus, he has standing to pursue claims
D. The district court erred in dismissing Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed
Amended Complaints against Hawlev TroxeU and Clements Brown pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
Idaho is a notice pleading jurisdiction and Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed
Amended Complaints sufficiently pled causes of action against Hawley Troxell and Clements
~ r o w n .After
~ establishing that Reed Taylor has standing in the foregoing section, he will now
address the pleading sufficiency of the following direct and derivative causes of action:

'See also Section III(C)(ii), which is incorporated by reference herein
'See Section III(i3) above, which is incorporated by reference herein.
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i.

Reed Taylor sufficiently pled conversion.

When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has standing to
bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g., First Sec. Bank of
Idaho, N.A. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57,664 P.2d 281,284-285 (Ct. App.
1983); U S . v. McCleskey Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (Ga. 1969). Property and proceeds subject
to security interests may not be disposed of without consent of the secured party. I.C.

5 28-9-

3 15. A secured creditor has the right to recover from the recipient of proceeds from a security
interest:
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a conversion of the
collateral, there is a conversion on the part of the one who sells, as well as on the part of
the one who purchases, or to who117 property is transferred, or a third party who exercises
dominion over the collateral or its proceeds.. .
79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions

5

157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see

also Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984); Lzlssier v. Mau Van
Development, Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 814 (Hawaii App. 1983); Nelson v. Jones, 38 Idaho 664, 671,
224 P. 435,438 (1924); Western Farm Sewice, Inc. v. Olsen, 90 P.3d 1053 (Wash. 2004) (when
a debtor transfers collateral subject to a perfected security interest, the secured party may
commence an action against the purchaser for conversion); In re Bailey, 197 F.3d 997, 1000 (9th
Cir. 1999); Case Covp. v. Gehrke, 91 P.3d 362,365 (Ariz. App. 2004).
The primary reason for bringing claims of conversion is that Hawley Troxell and
Clements Brown have been accepting payments for attorneys' fees subject to Reed Taylor's
traceable security interests in all of the revenues and certain assets of AIA Services and AIA
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Insurance, whether direct security interests or traceable proceeds from security interests. Reed
Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints pled direct and derivative claims of
conversion. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-20, 133-59 and 160-62; Vol. 11, pp. 239-58 and 406-36.)
ii.

Reed Taylor sufficiently pled fraud and constructive fraud.

Generally, the following nine elements in order to state a claim for fraud:
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable
reliance; and (9) resultant injury.
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that
misrepresentations and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded summary
judgment in buyer's action for fraud). Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud"
as an alternative cause of action to common law fraud. See e.g., Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co.,
98 Idaho 266,561 P.2d 1299 (1977); McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367,371,353 P.2d 760,762
(1960) (recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative cause of action to fraud and that the
requirement of pleading and proving all nine elements of fraud "is not the case").
Otherwise stated. "constructive fraud" arises by operation of law from a course of
conduct which, if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage,
irrespective of the existence or evidence of actual intent to defraud. Constructive fraud,
sometimes called legal fraud, is nevertheless fraud, although it rests upon presumption
and rests less upon W i v e intent than does moral or actual fraud.. ..
The conscience is not necessarily affected by it. Indeed, it has been said that constructive
fraud generally involves a mere mistake of fact. It requires neither actual dishonesty nor
intent to deceive, being a breach of legal or equitable duty that, irrespective of the moral
guilt of the wrongdoer, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive
others, to injure public interests, or to violate public or private confidence. In its generic
sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a
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breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence that results in damage to another
If there is any distinction to be found between the terms "constructive" and "legal" as
applied to fraud, it probably amounts to this: Breach of a fiduciary relationshiu or of a
contract ubenimae fidei is usuallv called "constructive fraud," whereas the term "legal
fraud" is generally used to characterize a misrepresentation made without knowledge of
its falsity. Constructive fraud mav result from reckless and heedless representations,
although they are not made with a deliberate intent to deceive.
37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit 3 9 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis added)
Reed Taylor's Complaints andlor proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled direct
and derivative claims for kaud and constructive fraud. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-18, 21-22, 133-59 and
164-66; Vol. 11, pp. 239-58,262-63,406-32 and 441-43.)
iii.

Reed Taylor sufficiently pled breaches of fiduciary duties.

Evidence that an attorney has violated rules of ethics pertaining to dual representation is
sufficient to support a claim that an attorney violated common-law fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Hendvy v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A shareholder's allegations that a law firm's

conflict of intercst representing two corporations is sufficient to state a claim for brcach of
fiduciary duty against the law firm. Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Sen$ & Cohen LLC, 484 F. Supp.2d
337 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The pleading requirements necessary to state a cause of action against a
lawyer for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties is the s a n e as against any other
person or entity. In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1007 (8th Cir. 2007),
Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133

(Mass. App. 2000).
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Reed Taylor's claims for breach of fiduciary duties are three-fold: (1) claims brought
directly against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown for aiding and abetting or conspiring with
others to breach fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor; (2) claims pertaining to breach of
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor as a third-party beneficiary; and (3) those claims brought
directly and derivatively by Reed Taylor on behalf of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Reed
Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficielitly pled breaches of fiduciary
duties. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-18, 21-22, 133-59 and 171-73; Vol. 11, pp. 239-58, 262-63, 406-32 and
448-50.)
iv.

Reed Taylor sufficiently pled tortious interference.

The elements of a tortious interference claim are as follows:
(a) Existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of tlie contract on the part of the defendant, (c)
intentional interference causing a breach of the contract, and (d) injury to the plaintiff
resulting from the breach.
Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1027, 772 P.2d 228,234 (1988). Employees and agents are

third-parties when acting outside of their scope of authority. Houser v. City of Redmond, 586
P.2d 482,485 (Wash. 1978).
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled tortious
interference. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-19, 133-59 and 163-64; Vol. 11, pp. 239-59, 406-32,439-41.) The
d~strictcourt erred in dismissing these clairns. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.)
v.

Reed Taylor sufficiently pled malpractice.

The elements of a general legal malpractice action are:
(a) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part
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of the lawyer; (c) failure to perfonn the duty; and (d) the negligence of the lawyer must
have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client.
Harrideld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004). A derivative action may

be commenced against an attorney of an entity for malpractice. Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E. 2d

666 (Va. 2001); Wolcott v. Ginsburg, 746 F.Supp. 1113 (D.C. 1990).
When a corporation is insolvent, attorneys also have special obligations to creditors.
Willner v.' Fuel Distributors, Inc. v. Noreen, 882 P.2d 399, 406 (Alaska 1994). The lack of an

attorney-client relationship does not preclude a finding of a fiduciary duty, which is an issue of
fact for the jury. In re D.C. Equipment, Inc. v.Peshtigo National Bank, 112 B.R. 855,857 (W.D.
Mich. 1990).
The shareholder's individual claim based upon a contract between the corporation and
another may be brought as a third-party beneficiary action, despite lack of privity
between the plaintiff shareholder and the defendant, provided the shareholder is an
intended beneficiary of the contract.. .
12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp.

5

5921 (2008) (internal citations omitted) citing Vogel v. Reed Supply

Co., 177 S.E. 2d 273,278 (N.C. 1970) (citations omitted).

...[A]n attorney may owe a duty to a party who is not his or her client, but who is a thirdparty beneficiary to an agreement between the attorney and his or her client.
Accordingly, third party liability of an attorney arising from representation of a client
may be found to exist where the attorney is responsible for damage caused by his or her
negligence to a person intended to be benefited by his or her performance irrespective of
any lack of privity. Privity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary for a
duty to attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific harm which
occurred.. .
7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law 5 234 (2008) (internal citations omitted)
Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, and has voted the shares
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pursuant to his contractual rights appointing himself the sole office and director. He is also the
secured creditor of the insolvent AIA Services. For the same reasons articulated above in
Section III(C), Reed Taylor has standing to pursue direct and derivative claims against Hawley
Troxell and Clements Brown for malpractice. Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown knew that
the assets of the corporations could be turned over to Reed Taylor at any time and should be held
in trust for his benefit-thereby

creating third-party beneficiary rights for Reed Taylor.

Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled direct
and derivative claims for malpractice, and privity of contract is not required for derivative claims
for malpractice if the Court finds that he may not assert direct claims. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-18, 2122, 133-59 and 166-68; Vol. 11, pp. 239-58, 262-63, 406-32 and 443-45.) The district court
apparently never addressed Reed Taylor's derivative malpractice claims when it erroneously
found that he did not have standing as a creditor or stock pledgee. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol.
111, pp. 468-83.) Rather, the district court focused solely on the basis that, under Hurrigfeld,
privity was a prerequisite to a malpractice claim. However, neither Hurrigfeld, nor any other
Idaho case, involved facts even similar to those here, where the complaining party (Reed Taylor)
was a stock pledgee and the sole secured creditor, and all of the corporate directors were alleged
wrongdoers and would not take action. To the extent Hurvigfeld holds to the contrary to his
direct claims, it should be overruled or an exception created to the rule stated therein.
vi.

Reed Taylor sufficient pled violations of I.C. 5 48-601, et seq.

Idaho's Consumer Protection Act provides for various claims for unfair, improper or
unconscionable methods, including those involving an elderly person. I.C.
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$5 48-601 through

608. Although never addressed in Idaho, other courts do not afford attorneys blanket immunity
froin claims brought by opposing counsel under the unfair trade practices and consumer
protection acts. See e.g., Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tagev, 952 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008);
Buvns ex re1 Ofice of Public Guardian v. Hale and Dorv LLP, 445 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.Ct. Mass.
2006); St. Paul Five and Marine Ins. Co. v. Ellis & Ellis, 262 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Campos v.
Bvooksbank, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D.Ct. N.M. 2000); Burnap v. Linnartz, 38 S.W.3d 612,61920, (Tex. App. 2000).
In Chapman, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a judgment against a debtor's
attorney under the Unfair Trade Practices Act:
However far the duty of an attorney to zealously represent his client extends. it
necessarily falls short of the point at which the representation constitutes fraud on a third
party or the assistance in the pernetration of such a fraud, whether by affirmative
misrepresentations or knowing nondisclosures.. .rTlhis court's refusal to permit litigants
to raise claims against opposing counsel under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act cannot be construed, as the defendant suggests, as affording blanket immunity to
attorneys for tortious acts they commit against third warties while representing clients.. .
Chapman, 952 A.2d I, 20-21 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled several
alternative claims under I.C. $ 48-601, et seq. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-18, 20-21, 133-59, 168-71; Vol
11, pp. 239-58, 261-62,406-32,446-48.) In the action against Clements Brown, the district court
dismissed Reed Taylor's alternative claims under I.C. $48-601, et seq., by finding that he has no
privity of contract under I.C. $ 48-608(1), without addressing the alternative violations or his
derivative claim which would not require privity of contract. (R. Vol. 1, p. 202.) In the action
against Hawley Troxell, the district coui-t failed to even address Reed Taylor's claims under 1.C
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5 48-601, et seq.

(R. Vol. 111, 468-83.) The district court erred in d~smissingthese claims. (R.

Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.)
vii.

Reed Taylor sufficiently pled excessive compensation/waste.

To maintain a claim for excessive compensation, a plaintiff need only show that the
board lacked independence or the board lacked good faith. In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d
563,589 (Del. 2007); Marcus v. Lincolnshire Mgmt., Inc., 409 F.Supp.2d 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Reed

Taylor's

proposed

Amended

Complaints

sufficiently

pled

excessive

compensation/waste (e.g., aiding and abetting others in the commission of excessive
compensation claim). (R. Vol. I, pp. 133-59 and 173-74; Vol. 11, pp. 406-32 and 450-51.) The
district court never addressed Reed Taylor's excessive compensation claims. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.)
viii.

Reed Taylor sufficiently pled aiding and abetting in the commission of torts.

Idaho law is well settled that those who aid, abet, counsel or encourage a wrongdoer by
looks, signs, words, or gestures are equally liable to the injured party. See Todd v. Sullivan
Const. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 191 P.3d 196 (2008) (emphasis added). Similarly, attorneys are
liable for the aiding and abetting of constructive fraud. See Hearst v. Hearst, 50 A.D. 3d 959.
Like normal tortfeasors, attorneys may be liable to others under various legal theories,
including aiding and abetting and other torts. Hearst, 50 A.D. 3d 959.; In re MS55, Inc., 2007
WL 2669150 (D. Colo. 2007); Traub v. Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382 (Ga. App. 2003); Adena,
Inc. v Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2000); In In re MS55, the court held that the plaintiff pled claims against attorneys:
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...I find Trustee sufficiently alleged the following claims on behalf of the cornoration's
creditors: (1) [attorney defendantsl engaged in a civil conspiracy with Leach, Blue Chip,
Akainai, and members of Debtor's management to commit fraudulent transfers that
breached fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors; and (2) [attorney defendantsl aided and
abetted Debtor's officers and directors in breaching their fiduciary duties to unsecured
creditors. Thus, I find the bankruptcy judge's determination that Trustee's allegation only
supported "clainis of the debtor against a third party" was in error.
In ue MS55, 2007 W L 2669150 * 9 (emphasis added). In Adena, the court held that claims could
be brought against attorneys:
To establish a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must
show: ( I ) a breach of fiduciary duty owed to another; (2) knowledge of the breach by the
aider or abettor; and (3) substantial assistance or encouragement by the aider or abettor in
effecting that breach. The court.. .did not require the direct and knowing participation
that the Defendants contend 1s required. Rather, the court allowed the claim to procecd
based upon a showing of "substantial assistance or encouragement." Moreover, even if
such a heightened involvement were required, the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the
rattorneyl Defendants were indeed knowing and active participants in Malecki's breach.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of aiding and abetting a breach
of fiduciary duty against the [attorney1 Defendants.
Id., 162 F.Supp.2d at 357-358 (emphasis added).
Reed Taylor's Coniplaints and proposed Amended Coiiiplaints pled aiding and abetting
in the commission of torts. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23 and 133-75; Vol. 11, pp. 239-64,262-63 and 40652.) The district court erred when it ignored and never addressed the extensive authorities cited
by Reed Taylor, including the analogous cases cited above. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp.
468-83.)
ix.

Reed Taylor sufficiently pled civil conspiracy in the commission of torts.

Idaho law is well settled on claims for civil conspiracy and the minimal pleading
requirements.

Argonatlt Insurance Conzpany v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 379, 386 P.2d 964, 966
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(1963); Kloppenbttrg v. Mays, 60 Idaho 19, 88 P.2d 513 (1939) (an agreement becomes a
conspiracy when its purpose is to do something that is unlawful or some lawful thing in an
unlawful manner). Attorneys are also subject to liability for claims of civil conspiracy. Tmub v.
Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382, 387 (Ga. App. 2003); Bunco Popz~larNorth America v. Gandi,

876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a cause of action for a conspiracy); see also Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Heiserman, 898 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Colo. 1995) (noting that a breach of fiduciary

duty is an act associated with civil conspiracy).
The prime distinction between civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting is that a
t e a wrongful activity or to commit a
conspiracy involves an agreement to ~ a r t i c i ~ ain
tortious act, while aiding and abetting focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gives
'substantial assistance' to someone who performs wrongful conduct, not on whether the
defendant agrees to join the wrongful conduct.
15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 3 (2008) (emphasis added). In order for more than one party to enter
into a joint defense or common interest doctrine, each party must be represented by separate
counsel. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 213 B.R. 433 (1997);
Restatement (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 76 (2000). Reed Taylor asserted that separate
counsel was not retained and the joint defense agreements were improper and unlawful.* (R.
Vol. I, pp. 6-9, 17, and 146; Vol. 11, pp. 247-48, and 420-21.)
Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints sufficiently pled civil
conspiracy in the commission of torts. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23 and 133-75; Vol. 11, pp. 239-64,262-

Joint defense or con~moninterest agreements are generally not discoverable, however, Hawley Troxell and
Clements Brown provided copies of the agreements to testifyiilg experts thereby waiving attorney-client privilege.
See e.g., CP Kelco U.S. Inc. v. Phannacia Corp., 213 F.R.D. 176 (D. Del. 2003). (R. Vol. I, pp. 21 1-22; Vol. 111, pp.
489-99.) This makes the issue of attorney-client privilege moot and the Court should order the documents produced.
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63 and 406-52.)9 The potential issue of attorney-client privilege pertaining to the purportedly
privileged documents is moot. However, even if such agreements did not exist, Reed Taylor also
asserted that Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown inappropriately attended and participated in
board meetings thereby assisting others in the coinmission of torts. (R. Vol. I, pp. 17, 144 and
155; Vol. 11, pp. 257-58,412 and 430.)
E. Assuming Idaho adopts the "litigation privilege" as a defense for attorneys, it does
not provide complete immunity for tort claims and claims pertaining to exceeding
the scope of purported representation.
In the Opinions and Orders dismissing Reed Taylor's Complaints, the district court relied
heavily on the so-called "litigation privilege," although it "found no Idaho case law addressing
the doctrine" and that the defense "was a doctrine that has yet to be addressed by Idaho's
appellate courts." (R. Vol. I, p. 194; Vol. 111, p. 474.) Reed Taylor asserts that the litigation
privilege defense, if adopted, should not provide a license for an attorney to commit torts or take
other inappropriate actions, and the scope of immunity it provides should not be unlimited.
Attorneys are liable for acts and torts committed outside the scope of their representation
because the law does not provide absolute immunity. Alpert v. Cvain, Caton & James P.C., 178
S.W. 3d 398 (Tex. App. 2005) (attorney liable for fraud committed outside the scope of

representation). Here, Reed Taylor pled numerous caused of action, including, conversion,
which have no relevance to the litigation privilege defense's scope of representation. (R. Vol. I,
pp. 18-22 and 160-69; Vol. 11, pp. 258-62 and 432-50.) Moreover, Reed Taylor specifically pled
At the initial pleading stage of these actions, Reed Taylor's conspiracy claim adminedly falls on the legality and/or
contents of the purported joint defense agreements and facts centered around the representation of individuals
instead of the corporations through the agreements, facts or agreements occurring at unauthorized board meetingsin
which the attorneys participated, and possible unknown facts asno discovery has been coi~ductedin either action.
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that Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown exceeded their scope of representation. (R. Vol. I, pp.
139-40; Vo. 11, pp. 413-14.) These pled facts, which must be accepted as true, defeat a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.

F. The district court erred by not permitting Reed Taylor to file amended complaints.
The twin purposes behind the court rule govcrning amendments to pleadings "are to
allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make pleadings
serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts at issue."
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999). If a

"complaint is capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, a
refksal to grant permission to amend would deprive a plaintiff of a substantial right."
Marlutallev v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 135, 326 P.2d 994, 997 (1958). "As long as the

proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the proposed claim." Christensen Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 872,993 P.2d
at 1203 (citing Dufin v. Idaho lmpvovement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013, 895 P.2d 1195, 1206
(1995)). "Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadiilgs in furtherance of
justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 348,352 (1960).
Reed Taylor's proposed Amended Complaints pled valid causes of action as set forth
above. (R. Vol. I, pp. 158-74; Vol. 11, pp. 432-51.) The district court erred by not permitting
hiin to file his Amended Complaints and by considering the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his Amended Complaints. (R. Vol. I, pp. 188-206; Vol. 111, pp. 468-83.)
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G. The district court erred in awarding fees to Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown.
It is error to award attorney fees for pursuing an action frivolously simply because an
action is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Werlinger v.
State, 117 Idaho 47, 50, 785 P.2d 172, 175 (Ct. App. 1990). It is an abuse of discretion for a
court to predicate an award of attorneys' fees on matters not contained in the record. Severson v.
Hermann, 116 Idaho 497,499,777 P.2d 269,271 (1989). The district court abused its discretion
and misapplied or failed to apply the proper law. The award of fees should be reversed.
i.

If the Court reversed the district court's dismissal of one or more of Reed
Taylor's actions, the award of attorneys' fees must he vacated as well.

If the Court reverses the dismissal of an action by the district court, an award of
attorneys' fees must also be vacated. Davis v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 109 Idaho
810, 816, 712 P.2d 51 1, 517 (1985). Thus, if the Court reversed the dismissal of Reed Taylor's
Complaints against Hawley Troxell andlor Clements Brown, the award of fees must be vacated.
ii.

The district court erred in finding Reed Taylor's entire cases were frivolous.

A court may only award attorneys fees under I.C. $ 12-121 "only when it finds, from the
facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation ..." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); DesFosses v. DesFosses, 122 Idaho 634, 638, 836
P.2d 1095, 1099 (1992) (emphasis added). "The district court should evaluate whether 'aJ

claims brought. ..are frivolous or without foundation'

before awarding attorney fees under I.C. $

12-121." Puckcett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 170, 158 P.3d 937, 946 (2007) (quoting Bingham v.
Montane Resource Assocs., 133 Idaho 420,427,987 P.2d 1035, 1042 (1999)) (emphasis added).
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The district court erred when it found that Reed Taylor's entire actions were brought and
pursued frivolously. Based upon the legal authorities cited in this Brief, Reed Taylor's Motions
to Disallow Fees and his Motions for Reconsideration, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that
all claims brought by Reed Taylor were frivolous. (R. Vol. I, pp. 72-128; R. Vol. 11, pp. 319-74;
Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00027-55,00118-131,00179-205 and 00262-76.)
iii.

The district court erred in awarding fees under I.C. 5 12-121 when Reed
Taylor asserted claims and issues of first impression, novel claims, and
claims involving unsettled law.

Where a case involves a novel legal question or issues of first impression, attorneys fees
should not be awarded under I.C.

12-121. Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731

(2005). In Campbell, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of an award of
attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C.

5 12-121:

...the district court.. .noted that this case involved novel issues, including a matter of first
impression.. .Where a case involves a novel question, attorney fees should not be granted.
Id. at 651, 115 P.3d 742 (emphasis added). Attorney fees are not properly awarded under I.C.

5

12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) when unsettled or conflicting issues of law are raised. Hanf v.
Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 370, 816 P.2d 320,326 (1991).
The Court has never addressed the novel, first impression, and unsettled legal issues
addressed in Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended Complaints addressed in these
appeals, including, without limitation: (1) whether a party can pursue claims against opposing
counsel; (2) whether a stock pledgee or secured creditor of an insolvent corporation can pursue
direct andlor derivative claims on behalf of corporations; (3) whether an attorney can lawfully
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accept paynent of fees from funds the attorneys knows is subject to security interests; (4)
whether an attorney can aid and abet or conspire with others to commit torts; (5) whether an
elderly person can bring claims against opposing counsel under I.C.
whether an attorney owes third-party obligations to non-clients.

5 48-601, et seq.; (6)

Moreover, the conflicting

authorities cited by all parties, including the district court, demonstrate that the law is unsettled
on various issues. (R. Vol. I, pp. 72-128; R. Vol. 11, pp. 319-74; Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00027-55,
001 18-13 1,00179-205 and 00262-76.)
Any one of the foregoing issues is sufficient basis for Reed Taylor to defeat a request for
fees pursuant to I.C. 5 12-121, and the district court erred in awarding them.
iv.

The district court erred in awarding fees under 1.C. 12-121 when it applied
the "litigation privilege" - a first impression defense.

Where a case involves a novel legal question or issues of first impression, attorneys fees
should not be awarded under I.C. 5 12-121. Campbell, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731.
When the district court dismissed Reed Taylor's Complaints in part based upon the
litigation privilege, the district court acknowledged that it "found no Idaho case law addressing
the doctrine" and that it "was a doctrine that has yet to be addressed by Idaho's appellate courts."
(R. Vol. 1, p. 194; Vol. 111, p. 474.) An issue of first impression bars an award of fees under I.C.

5 12-12], Campbell, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731.

(Mot. Aug. R. pp. 00127 (n. 8), 00147-154,

00271 (n. 8) and 00289-96.) The district court erred in awarding fees under I.C.

5 12-121 on this

basis alone as the defense has never been addressed by the Idaho appellate courts.
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v.

The district court erred in awarding fees under I.C.

Attorney fees awarded under I.C.

9 30-1-746.

5 30-1-746 are discretionary.

McCann v. McCann, 138

Idaho 228,61 P.3d 585 (2002). Under I.C. 5 30-1-746, the court may:
(2) Order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including counsel
fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds the proceeding was commenced or
maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose; or
(3) Order a party to pay an opposing party's reasonable expenses, including counsel
fees.. .if it finds the pleading.. .was not well grounded in fact.. .or warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law
and was interposed for an improper purpose ...
I.C.

5 30-1-746(2)

and (3). The ABA Official Comment to LC.

5

30-1-746 "follows generally

the provisions of rule 1 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 746(3) will not be
necessary in states which already have a counterpart to rule 11." Id.
As an initial matter, when the district court found that Reed Taylor had no standing to
pursue derivative actions, it could not award fees under I.C.
of the stated class of parties with standing.

5 30-1-746 as he was not a member

Moreover, since Reed Taylor's claims were not

brought in violation of Rule 11 and were not frivolous, the district court should not have awarded
fees under I.C. 5 30-1-746. (Mot. Aug. R. pp. 001 11-12 and 00255-57.)
vi.

The district court erred in awarding fees under I.C. 5 48-608.

"The court in its discretion may award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant if it finds
that the plaintiffs action is spurious or brought for harassment purposes only." I.C. 5 48-608(5).
"Spurious" is defined as "[dleceptively suggesting an erroneous origin ...[o]f doubtful or low
quality ..." Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (1999), p. 1411. "Harassment" is defined
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as "[w]ords, conduct, or action (usu. Repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific
person, annoys, alanns, or causes substantial emotional d~stressin that person and serves no
legitimate purpose." Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (1999), p. 721.
Reed Taylor is an elderly person who has been stripped of his income and the prospects
of being paid under his $6M Note. (R. Vol. I, pp. 20-21 and 168-71; Vol. 11, pp. 261-62 and
446-48.)

As indicated in this Brief, Reed Taylor's Complaints and proposed Amended

Complaints, Reed Taylor did not pursue his claims under I.C.

5 48-608 in a spurious manner or

for harassment purposes, and the district court made no such finding. (Mot. Aug. R. p. 001 12
and 00256.)
vii.

The district court erred in awarding fees because Hawley Troxell and
Clements Brown failed to segregate fees.

Fees are properly denied if the claimant fails to segregate fees between covered an
uncovered claims. Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 79, 910 P.2d 744, 751 (1996).
Here, both Hawley Troxell and Clernents Brown failed to segregate fees between claims brought
under common law and those brought under I.C.

$5 48-608 and 30-1-746. (Mot. Aug. R. pp.

00005-26, 00131, 00165-177 and 00275.) Consequently, the district court erred in awarding fees
under that authority.

H. The Court should render opinions on all of the above issues to prevent further
appeals.
The Court should rule on all issues on appeal to save judicial time and resources and to
prevent other appeals and result in a speedy resolution. In re Estate ofKeeven, 110 Idaho 452,
456-57, 716 P.2d 1224, 1228-29 (1986). Thus, the Court should rule on all issues raised to
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promote judicial economy and prevent further appeals which would likely delay timely final
decisions on the merits, should the Court reverse the district court's dismissal of these actions.I0
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, attorneys do not have a license to commit torts and take
property or money belonging to others without bearing any responsibility or liability for their
actions. The Court should reverse the District Court's dismissal of Reed Taylor's Complaints
against Hawley Troxell and Clements Brown, reverse the denial of his Motions to Amend, and
reverse the award of attorneys' fees.
DATED this 25" dav June. 2009.

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

'O For example, if the Court reversed for considering matters outside the pleadings, then the district court could
nevertheless grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based upon lack of standing and the "litigation privilege." Thus, judicial
economy would be served by deciding all legal issues raised in these appeals.
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